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Abstract
Recent work [11] suggests that adversarial examples are “features not bugs”. If
adversarial perturbations are indeed useful but non-robust features, then what is
their origin? In order to answer these questions, we systematically examine the
learning dynamics of adversarial perturbations both in the pixel and frequency
domains. We find that: (1) adversarial examples are not present at initialization but
instead emerge very early in training, typically within the first epochs, as verified
by a novel breakpoint-based analysis; (2) the low-amplitude high-frequency nature
of common adversarial perturbations in natural images is critically dependent on
an implicit bias towards sparsity in the frequency domain; and (3) the origin of this
bias is the locality and translation invariance of convolutional filters, along with (4)
the existence of useful frequency-domain features in natural images.
We provide a simple theoretical explanation for these observations, providing a clear
and minimalist target for theorists in future work. Looking forward, our findings
suggest that analyzing the learning dynamics of perturbations can provide useful
insights for understanding the origin of adversarial sensitivities and developing
robust solutions.
1 Introduction
Despite the enormous progress in training neural networks to solve hard tasks, they remain surprisingly
and stubbornly sensitive to imperceptibly small worst-case perturbations known as adversarial
examples. This lack of robustness has sparked many theories [6, 14, 22, 4, 3, 2, 8, 20] but together
they fail to explain many perplexing observations. Compelling recent work [11] has illuminated
the situation greatly by proposing the ‘Features-Not-Bugs’ (FNB) hypothesis, which states that
adversarial sensitivity is a simple consequence of state-of-the-art models learning well-generalizing
features in the dataset. From the FNB perspective, since models are trained only for maximizing
accuracy, they have the freedom to choose useful but non-robust features that humans find non-
intuitive.
What is the nature of these features? Recent work[27] proposes the High Frequency (HF) hypothesis,
which states that state-of-the-art classifiers are using low amplitude, high frequency features in natural
images. Given the strong theoretical connection between adversarial features and perturbations in
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linear models[7], it stands to reason that we should expect a similarly strong relationship in nonlinear
models. In this vein, [27] also finds that adversarial perturbations of naturally trained models tend to
be higher frequency. In contrast, those of adversarialy trained models tend to be lower frequency,
explaining several otherwise perplexing tradeoffs seen in corruption-based data augmentation studies
[27, 18]. Though not all adversarial features are high frequency [27], understanding the origin of
high frequency features is an important step towards building robust, interpretable models.
In this paper we propose the Implicit Fourier Regularization (IFR) hypothesis, which claims that:
Implicit regularization in frequency domain, directly caused by the translation invariance of the
convolution operation, is necessary for the evolution of high frequency adversarial perturbations.
Through systematic experiments examining the learning dynamics of deep linear and nonlinear
models, we provide strong empirical support for this claim, along with theoretical support in the case
of deep linear models.
Main Contributions Our main contributions are as follows. First, by exploring learning dynamics,
we confirmed the “Features not Bugs” Hypothesis. Second, based on extensive, systematic experi-
ments, we propose the Implicit Fourier Regularization Hypothesis: that the frequency-driven nature
of adversarial examples for real-world deep networks originates from an implicit bias towards sparsity
in the Fourier domain, which in turn is caused by the translation invariance of convolutions. We
extend the theory of [9] to bounded-width convolutions in this regard, and we find that the radial
distribution of energy in the frequency spectrum of the adversarial perturbation reveals the different
implicit biases induced by various architectures and weight initializations.
2 Related Work
Explanations of Adversarial Examples. Several papers have tried to understand the conditions that
are necessary for sensitivity to adversarial noise. Some work has focused on statistical properties
of the data distribution [6, 14, 22, 4, 3], whereas others have studied overfitting or underfitting as
the key property [2, 8, 20]. See [11] for an comprehensive review. However, to our knowledge no
existing work has used learning dynamics nor implicit regularization theory as a way to understand
adversarial development.
Fourier Analysis of Input Perturbations. Recent work on robustness to adversarial and noise
perturbations has used a Fourier perspective to understand how various data augmentation techniques
can make different models more robust [11, 18]. In [11] the authors have found that adversarial
training and other forms of noise perturbations produce models which are robust to high frequency
noise. With this knowledge, they have designed better noise generation and data augmentation
techniques. Our work tries to explain why adversarial examples of convolutional neural network
evolves in frequency space compared to other models.
Relationship between Performance and Adversarial Attacks. Some papers have study the rela-
tionship between performance and adversarial development. In [21] the authors have established that
for certain loss functions, adversarial examples are inescapable and that input complexity could affect
the robustness of the model. In addition, [11, 26, 23, 16] have found that for classification problems
adversarial examples improve the performance of the classifier, and that adversarial robustness is at
odds with accuracy.
Theories of Learning Dynamics & Implicit Regularization. This line of theoretical work aims
to understand how overparameterized neural nets with more parameters than training data can
possibly generalize [24, 9, 5, 25]. Early work revealed the surprising phenomenon of implicit
regularization: When a loss surface possesses many global minima of equal value, which is common
in overparametrized models, the specific global minima that a learning algorithm converges to can
depend greatly on seemingly idiosyncratic details such as the choice of parameter initialization
scheme, specific learning algorithm, or architecture. Recent studies have also shown that such
implicit bias/regularization is responsible for much if not most of the generalization performance of
state-of-the-art image classifiers[13, 1]. Our paper specifically utilizes recent work[9] that shows that
overparametrized deep linear models with and without convolutions induce dramatically different
implicit biases, the former yielding a bias towards sparsity in the Fourier domain. In Section 3.3.1 we
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 1: Testing the Features not Bugs (FNB) Hypothesis. Left: Distribution of ReLU Changes
(Metric for Breakpoint movement) for (a) initial and (b) final ResNet18 model along perturbation
from original to adversarial/random images. Right: Distribution of Roughness (Metric for Curvature)
for (c) initial and (d) final ResNet18 Model along same perturbations. Both ReLU Changes and
Roughness start the same for both perturbations, but increase more by the end of training for the
adversarial perturbations.
hypothesize that such implicit Fourier regularization, combined with useful features in the dataset,
are necessary for the emergence of sparse high frequency adversarial examples during learning.
3 Empirical Study of Learning Dynamics
3.1 Learning Dynamics supports Features-Not-Bugs Hypothesis
Breakpoints migrate to Adversarial Directions at a far higher rate than Random Directions.
To further understand and test the FNB hypothesis, we used function space theory developed for
ReLU Neural Networks that re-parametrizes the latter as continuous piecewise linear (CPWL)
spline functions with breakpoints/breakplanes (where slope changes discontinuously) and delta-slope
parameters(the magnitude of the change in slope along a particular direction) [24, 19]. From the
spline perspective, modeling curvature in the target function necessitates the flow of breakpoints
from their initial locations (determined by the weight initialization) to regions of high curvature. The
theory has been successful in explaining several otherwise perplexing phenomenon including the
need for overparametrization in training, the structure of the loss surface, the Hessian spectrum’s
correlation with smoothing, and implicit regularization.
Motivated by this theory, our interest in adversarial examples, and the "features not bugs" (FNB)
hypothesis, a natural question is: To what degree are adversarial attacks take advantage of input
directions that already have a preexisting high density of breakpoints? Or do breakpoints only move
during training to functionally relevant directions that then are utilized by the adversarial attack?
In order to test this, we trained a ResNet18 model on the CIFAR-10 dataset. After training, we used
the Foolbox package [17] to generate adversarial attacks for every example in the test set via an `∞
Projected Gradient Descent attack [12](see Sec. B.4). Once we had the adversarial examples, we
pass both the original and adversarial images through the intermediate models (saved during training)
and measured two observables along the line connecting the original x and adversarial xa := x+ δ
image: (1) Changes in binary ReLU states (active to inactive or vice versa); and (2) the change in
curvature in the logits for correct and adversarial categories. Then we compare both of these metrics
to a noise-perturbed example image xr := x + r with the same norm as the adversarial example
(‖xa‖ = ‖xr‖), but perturbed in a different random direction r ∼ N (0,1).
In Figure 1a,b, we can see that the distribution of the fraction of ReLU changes for the both random
and adversarial directions is the same at the beginning of training but then diverges significantly by
the end. Furthermore, in Figure 1c,d, we can see that the distribution of roughness (Measured as the
deviation from the normal vector) per example along the adversarial direction increases through time
and diverges for adversarial vs random perturbations. This can also be seen for intermediate models
(Sup. Figure 6).
Success of Adversarial Attacks early in training is correlated with Classification Accuracy. To
further test the FNB hypothesis, we ask: Does the development of adversarial examples during
training correlate with gains in accuracy? To answer this we select model snapshots from intermediate
times during training and perform adversarial attacks on them. We considered an adversarial attack
to be successful if the original image was correctly classified by the model and if the adversarial
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 2: (a) Successful Final Network Adversarial attacks lag behind Successful Attacks on inter-
mediate models. Performance lag suggests that the nature of the adversarial attacks changes during
training. (b) Distribution of radial energy kr of the Fourier spectrum of adversarial perturbations. (c)
Distribution of angular energy kφ (in degree) of the Fourier spectrum of adversarial perturbations.
(b,c) show an evolution of adversarial perturbations over training from lower to higher frequencies
for the ResNet18 model, and from certain directions to all directions uniformly.
example was within a Euclidean distance of , i.e., ‖xa − x‖ ≤ , as defined by the attack (Supp.
Sec. B.4).
Figure 2 shows that the adversarial success rate, defined as the percentage of examples for which a
successful adversarial attack was found, increased by the same amount as the training/test accuracy.
This suggests that adversarial examples develop in the model as performance increases, further
supporting the FNB hypothesis. However, we also see that the adversarial examples computed for the
final network after training lag behind in performance compared to the adversarial attack computed
for intermediate models (Figure 2). This indicates that the final network’s adversarial attacks are
not fully transferable to the intermediate networks. This raises the question: Does the nature of the
adversarial attacks change during the course of learning?
Figure 3: Top: Dynamics of L2 and L∞ Norms of the Adversarial Perturbations (δ) during training for
ResNet18. As training occurs, adversarial attacks become smaller in amplitude. Bottom: Evolution
of the Adversarial Perturbation Spectrum (δ̂) during training. Adversarial Perturbation Spectrum
evolves from low-frequency attacks to high frequency attacks as performance increases.
Minimum Distance Adversarial Features Change throughout Learning. One of the most impor-
tant defining properties of adversarial examples is that they have low norm and are thus typically
imperceptible by eye. Are adversarial attacks low norm throughout training? We measured the
norm ‖δ‖ of the adversarial perturbation δ during learning, using the `2 and `∞ norms. Figure 3
(Top) shows us that both ‖δ‖2 and ‖δ‖∞ norms decrease during training, showing that low norm
perturbations require training well.
3.2 Dynamics of Adversarial Examples in Frequency Domain
Energy in Adversarial Perturbations flows from Low to Medium/High Frequencies Are adver-
sarial perturbations simply changing in norm, or do they also change in direction during training? To
test this, we took inspiration from [27] and adopted a Fourier perspective. Their work suggests that
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networks trained for adversarial robustness tend to be robust to high frequency perturbations and so
we decided to study the learning dynamics of adversarial perturbations in the frequency domain.
As with previous experiments, we performed adversarial attacks on intermediate modelsMt during
training, and measured the 2-D Discrete Fourier spectrum δ̂t := Fδt of the perturbation δt. In Figure 3
(Bottom), we see that early on in training the adversarial perturbations tend to contain low frequencies.
As training progresses, we see the evolution towards higher frequencies. Thus as training progresses,
adversarial perturbations contain more and higher frequencies with lower amplitudes (decrease in ‖δt‖
over time). This can also be observed in Figures 2b and 2c, where we show the marginal radial and
angular distributions E(kr), E(kφ) of the energy spectrum E(kr, kφ) := |δ̂(kr cos kφ, kr sin kφ)|2C,
where (kr, kφ) denote polar coordinates in the frequency domain. We also observe that (i) the radial
energy distribution shifts from low to high frequency kr, and (ii) the angular energy distribution
becomes more uniform, corresponding to the observed ring structure.
3.3 Implicit Regularization in Frequency Domain impacts Adversarial Perturbations
Recent theoretical work [9, 24, 19] has shown that learning dynamics – influenced by the choice
of model parametrization, weight initialization scheme, and gradient descent-based optimization
algorithm – plays a pivotal role in the generalization performance of deep networks[1] by inducing an
implicit model bias in the form of regularization. This implicit bias depends critically on the choice
of parametrization, sparking much recent work attempting to characterize the implicit bias/regularizer
for various popular (or analytically tractable) architectures and learning algorithms. In particular, [9]
shows that shallow linear convnets with a single hidden layer (1 full-width circular convolutional linear
layer followed by 1 fully connected linear layer) induce an implicit sparsity-promoting regularizer
in the Fourier domain i.e., RCONV (β) = ‖β̂‖1 where β̂ := Fβ is the Discrete Fourier Transform
(DFT) of the end-to-end linear transformation β := W2W1 represented by the linear network.
Furthermore the sparsity promotion intensifies with increasing depth yielding an implicit regularizer
RCONV,L(β) = ‖β̂‖2/L where L is the number of hidden convolutional layers.
In stark contrast, they find that a fully connected linear network with a single hidden layer (2 fully
connected linear layers) induces a ridge regularizerRFC(β) = ‖β‖22 in the pixel or space domain.
Furthermore, this regularization does not change with depth i.e., RFC,L(β) = ‖β‖22. Based on
this we state our main hypothesis: that convolutions induce an implicit Fourier regularization that
strongly impacts the frequency spectra of adversarial perturbations.
Recent theoretical work in this space focuses mostly on linear models and so our first step is to test this
hypothesis in linear models. Furthermore, given the complexity of modern architectures and learning
algorithms, we also ask: What are the minimal conditions (architecture type, hyperparameters, dataset,
etc.) that are required for different kinds of biases in adversarial examples to form? This approach
enables us to use linear learning dynamics theory to better understand the origin of adversarial
features and their dependence on model parameterization. Armed with our linear understanding, we
can then empirically explore nonlinear models like the ResNet18 model used for our earlier analysis.
3.3.1 Exploring Linear Models: Testing the Implicit Regularization Theory and expanding
to Bounded-Width Convolutions
Fully Connected vs Full-Width Convolutional Models show different implicit bias in the fre-
quency domain, as predicted by Implicit Fourier Regularization Theory[9]. In order to test the
implicit Fourier regularization (IFR) theory, we first trained a 1 hidden layer linear fully connected
model and a 1 layer hidden linear 3-channels (circular full-width) convolutional model on CIFAR-10.
Both models achieved similar test accuracies (Supp. Table 4)
In Figure 8a, we visualize the linear classifier (end-to-end weights) for the chosen class β := βĉn ,
the adversarial perturbation δ, and their respective Fourier spectra β̂ and δ̂ for the fully connected
and convolutional linear models. We observe that β̂ for the Full Width Convolution model is more
sparse compare to the Fully Connected model which is also reflected in the ‖β̂‖1 (Figure 5) and in the
radial distribution of energy (Figure 8b). This indicates that both models conform to the predictions
from IFR theory in [9], and that there is a direct relationship between β and δ. Furthermore, the IFR
Theory states that this difference should increase with depth. In Figure 5, we see that a deep full
width convolutional model yields a smaller ‖β̂‖1 than the shallow full width convolutional model,
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(a) (b)
Figure 4: (a) Example Visualization of δ and δ̂ for 5 nonlinear models with one hidden layer and 2
deep nonlinear networks. We observe qualitatively that both full width convolutional model have
sparse frequency spectrum, as compared to the Fully Connected and Locally Connected models
(For quantification, Table 5 and Supp Figure 10). (b) Radial (top, kr) and Angular (bottom, kφ in
degree). Distribution of Energy in δ̂ show that deep, bounded-Width models shift energy into higher
frequencies, and the angular energy of Fully Connected and Locally Connected models are distributed
more uniformly.
but that no such depth dependence exists for a 3 hidden layer fully connected vs 1 hidden layer fully
connected. Finally, Supp. Figure 9) shows that this behavior is not specific to one image but is indeed
present in the average Fourier spectrum of the adversarial perturbations for both fully connected and
full width convolutional models.
Increasing the Number of Channels and restricting to Bounded-Width Convolutions Concen-
trates Energy in Higher Frequencies. Given that the IFR theory[9] applies only to full-width
circular convolutions with equal number of hidden units as their input, we asked: does a similar bias
occur in bounded-width and multi-channel convolutions? In Figure 5, we observe that a 3-channel
3 × 3 kernel linear convolutional model is not less dense than its full-width counterpart, but does
show more concentration in higher frequencies than a Fully Connected model (Supp. Figures 9, 8b).
This is likely due to the additional spatial constraints imposed on the bounded-width convolutions
which, via the Fourier Uncertainty Principle (a space-limited kernel cannot be band-limited in Fourier
domain), drive frequency dispersion in the Fourier domain. This frequency dispersion is in tension
with the sparsity promotion predicted by the IFR theory, resulting in a compromise sparsity that
is lower than that of the full-width convolutional model. This intuition can be made rigorous for a
3-channel bounded-width linear convolutional model, extending the results of [9], as follows.
Lemma 1. For full-width convolutional networks, let the parametrization map be PCONV (w) =((
(w↓L ?wL−1) ?wL−2
)
. . . ?w1
)↓
, where w↓ denotes the flipped vector corresponding to w,
given by w↓[k] = w[D − k − 1] for k ∈ [D]. Furthermore let Cl,d := {wl ∈ RDl : wl[i] =
0 ∀i /∈ [d]} be the convex constraint set of bounded width (or spatially limited) filters. Then for a
depth L bounded width d (a.k.a. locally connected) linear convolutional network with parameters
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Figure 5: Comparison of Adversarial Perturbation Norms ‖δ̂‖p for p = 1, 2 for different linear and
nonlinear models. The relations between norms of nonlinear models mirror and accentuate those of
linear models. See Sections 3.3.1–3.3.2 for detailed comparisons.
w = [wl ∈ RD]Ll−1 and parameterization map PBWCONV (w), the implicit regularizer is
RPBWCONV (β) = min
w:PCONV (w)=β
‖w‖22 s.t. wl ∈ Cl,d ∀l ∈ [L].
Remark. Note that in the special case of a full-width convolution the implicit regularizer reduces
toRPBWCONV (β) = minw:PCONV (w)=β‖w‖22 = ‖β̂‖1, as expected from [9]. In the general case,
since each convolutional filter wl is constrained to be bounded-width (or spatially limited), we
can apply the Fourier Uncertainty Principle to get that its frequency spectrum cannot be bounded-
width (or equivalently, cannot be band limited) i.e., ∆(ŵl) ≥ 1/∆(wl) = O(1/d) where ∆(·) is a
reasonable measure of spread (e.g., standard deviation) in the set of filter weights.
Increasing the Number of Channels. In practice, most convolutional models have an expansion
from the input to hidden layer, so we asked: What is the effect of varying the number of channels
on δ. We expanded the previous bounded width model to 32 channels, and we observe that this
model exhibits more spread across all frequencies than the 3-channel model (Supp. Figure 9).
We hypothesize that for the linear model increasing the number of filters creates a more dense
representation which amplifies the energy in all frequencies.
Finally, in Sup. Figures 8a,b, we found that a 3 hidden layer 32-channel bounded convolutional model
produces energy in low and high frequencies, but with decreasing energy in medium frequencies. In
addition, the Fourier spectrum of the adversarial perturbations also show more energy in the low and
high frequencies (Supp. Figure 9). This indicates that even in a deep bounded width convolutional
model there is a tension between the sparsity induced by the implicit Fourier regularizer and the
requency dispersion induced by bounded width. In addition, it shows that β and δ are strongly linked.
Translation Invariance is Necessary for Sparsity in β̂ and δ̂. Is local connectivity sufficient for
this behavior? Or do we need translation invariance? We trained a linear locally connected model
with 3× 3 kernels and a single hidden layer. In Figure 1b, we see that the Fourier spectrum of the
β for the locally connected model has ‖β̂‖1 similar to the bounded-width convolutional model, but
energy is spread across all frequencies, similar to a fully connected model (Supp. Figure 9). This
indicates that translation invariance is a necessary component for inducing the implicit fourier bias
during learning.
Initial Weight Scale strongly impacts Implicit Regularization. In addition to the parametrization,
previous work [25] has shown that the scale of the initial weights, denoted α, also determines the
nature of implicit regularization in overparameterized linear models, with α 1 yielding the ridge
regularizer ‖β‖2 and α  1 yielding the lasso regularizer ‖β‖1. Motivated by this result, we
investigate the impact of initial weight scaling in the locally connected and convolutional linear
models for α ∈ {0.1, 1, 10}. In Supp. Figures( 11a,11b), we observe that high α induces sparse,
higher frequency adversarial attacks for both the locally connected and convolutional linear models,
although only the latter exhibits ring structure in its spectrum. This further shows that the choice of
initial weight scale strongly impacts the implicit regularizer, and that convolutions seem necessary
for inducing frequency-specific attacks.
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3.3.2 Nonlinear Models Mirror Theoretical and Experimental Results from Linear Models
Given the results obtained on linear models, we next explore the impact of higher expressive power
by investigating nonlinear models. For systematic comparison, we use the same shallow architectures
defined in Section 3.3.1 and add nonlinear Rectified Linear Units (ReLUs). Due to their higher
expressive power, these models achieve higher accuracy than their linear counterparts (Supp. Table 4).
Nonlinear Model intensify translation Invariance bias for Frequency-driven Adversarial Ex-
amples First, we compared the (nonlinear) Fully Connected model to the Full Width Convolutional
model, and we observe that the latter has a smaller ‖δ̂‖1 norm than the former (Figure 5), consistent
with results observed with the corresponding linear models. This further supports our implicit Fourier
regularizer hypothesis.
Next, we tried to evaluate if the bounded width convolutional model presents more power in high
frequencies, and if the locally connected model shows spread across all frequencies (as seen in their
linear counterpart). In Supp. Figure 10, we observe that the bounded model has more energy in
the frequency spectrum of the adversarial perturbation than the full width convolutional model and
the fully connected model. This relationship is more amplified than the that observed between the
linear counterparts. This difference is further observed in the energy distribution of the adversarial
perturbations (Figure 4b). In contrast to these results, the nonlinear locally connected model has a δ̂
similar to the fully connected model, not showing the large energy spread present in the linear model
(Supp. Figure 10, 4b).
Thus, the results/relations obtained from the nonlinear models mirror and accentuate the various
results/relations obtained from the linear models: for example, translation invariance is necessary for
sparsity in the Fourier spectrum of adversarial attacks. Furthermore, bounded width convolutional
models seem to exhibit a competition between the implicit Fourier regularizer and the frequency
dispersion due to the Fourier Uncertainty Principle. This shows that the implicit regularization
induced by the choice of parametrization still has a strong impact on adversarial perturbations in
nonlinear models.
Adversarial Spectra of Shallow ConvNet and ResNet Differ Greatly. Does this phenomenon
change in more complex state-of-the-art models like Resnets[10]? Previous work [15] suggests that
deep ResNets are able to capture more high frequency information from inputs than deep ConvNets,
controlling for depth and the number of nonlinearities. Does a similar relationship hold for shallow
ResNets and convolutional models? In order to test this we trained a shallow ResNet model on
CIFAR-10, and as expected it achieves the highest performance amongst all shallow nonlinear models
(Figure 4). In Table 2, we observe that ‖δ̂‖2 and ‖δ̂‖1 of the ResNet Model are comparable to that of
the bounded width convolutional model. However, in Figure 4b, we observe that the energy spectrum
of the adversarial perturbations for the ResNet model is more concentrated around middle frequencies
(see also Supp. Figure 10). Taken together, these results serve as evidence against the hypothesis that
ResNet models unconditionally exploit features with higher frequency than baseline Convnet models.
Frequency Spectra of VGG-19 & ResNet-18 show no difference compared to shallow models
Given the previous results on ConvNet vs ResNet adversarial perturbations, we decided to circle
back to the deep nonlinear models, whose adversarial perturbations originally sparked this study.
For this, we trained a VGG-19 model on CIFAR10, and it achieved comparable performance to
the ResNet-18 model (91% test accuracy). In Figure 4b, we observe that a small change in the
radial energy distribution of the ResNet model toward higher frequencies. This result is opposite
to the one shown for shallow ResNet, suggesting that depth could indeed have an effect on the
implicit regularizer of ResNet models. Finally, we hypothesize that this small difference in the energy
distribution could be further amplified by using a higher resolution dataset such as ImageNet, where
the higher frequency perturbations were first observed.
The results for nonlinear models further support the implicit Fourier regularizer hypothesis, and a
strong link between δ and β. Together these results strongly indicate that an implicit bias induced by
convolutional operations strongly impacts the frequency-domain dynamics and nature of adversarial
examples.
Conclusions and Future Work We probed the learning dynamics of adversarial examples, finding
that they are not present at initialization, but that they emerge during training in order to model
curvature, consistent with the Features-Not-Bugs hypothesis. We show that different parametrizations
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and initialization schemes induce different implicit biases, which in turn, induce different kinds of
energy spectra for adversarial examples. In particular, we demonstrate that the locality and translation
invariance in convolutions induces an implicit bias towards sparsity in Fourier domain. This implicit
bias, together with useful features in the dataset, is responsible for the low amplitude high frequency
nature of commonly observed adversarial attacks. We anticipate that our work will help clarify the
true nature of adversarial vulnerabilities, and thus guide us towards more robust and secure solutions.
Broader Impact
The potential beneficiaries of this work could be anyone who directly or indirectly utilizes neural
networks for important or dangerous tasks e.g. self-driving cars, financial trading, medical diagnosis
and prediction. By helping to elucidate the origin and root cause of adversarial sensitivity/vulnerability,
we hope our work will enable the design of neural network models that are far more robust and secure.
The only harm we can think of would accrue to those who wish to hack or spoof important systems
with adversarial attacks.
We do not present a new system here so there is no risk of system failure. We use natural image data
from the CIFAR-10 dataset, which do not contains any sensitive human data.
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A Additional Figures & Tables
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 6: Distribution of Roughness (Metric for Curvature) for epochs 0,5,10,20,25,40 (a,b,c,d,e,f
respectively) for ResNet18 Model with xa and xr perturbations. See that Roughness starts the same
for both perturbations, but increase more at the end of training for the Adversarial perturbations.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 7: Distribution of Fraction of ReLU Changes for epochs 0,5,10,20,25,40 (a,b,c,d,e,f respec-
tively) for ResNet18 Model with xa and xr perturbations. See that fraction of ReLU Changes
starts the same for both perturbations, but increase more at the end of training for the Adversarial
perturbations.
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(a) (b)
Figure 8: (a) Example Visualization of δ, δ̂, β and β̂ for 6 overparametrized linear models with one
hidden layer. We observe qualitatively (particularly in β̂) that both full width and bounded width
convolutional models are sparser than the Fully Connected model. For quantification, see Table 1. (b)
Top: Distribution of energy along in fourier spectrum
Model ‖δ̂‖2 ‖δ̂‖1 ‖β̂‖2 ‖β̂‖1
Fully Connected 20.77 ± 1.23 505.95 ± 32.22 546.89 ± 43.37 2232.46 ± 166.27
Full Width Convolution 17.52 ± 1.56 376.31 ± 32.66 544.83 ± 42.40 1598.37 ± 181.44
Bounded Width Convolution 20.65 ± 1.09 556.32 ± 32.64 500.67 ± 47.46 2623.04 ± 331.42
Deep Fully Connected 20.83 ± 1.25 503.92 ± 32.62 554.16 ± 38.95 2168.06 ± 134.07
Deep Full Width Convolution 17.13 ± 1.68 265.40 ± 41.72 522.99 ± 39.72 1417.68 ± 213.91
Deep Bounded Width Convolution 20.57 ± 0.94 550.30 ± 29.71 498.52 ± 47.15 2392.09 ± 278.55
Table 1: Frequency-Domain Norms of Predictor β̂ and Adv. Pert. δ̂ for Linear Models. With
Equivalent performance (See Sup Figure 4), Convolutional Models have smaller ‖β̂‖1, supporting
the implicit Fourier hypothesis.
Model ‖δ̂‖2 ‖δ̂‖1
Fully Connected 22.06 ± 1.35 534.34 ± 35.93
Locally Connected 22.32 ± 1.13 587.61 ± 29.89
Full Width Convolution 20.57 ± 1.11 405.49 ± 34.16
Bounded Width Convolution 24.63 ± 1.36 665.22 ± 38.55
Shallow ResNet 26.36 ± 0.74 709.06 ± 20.76
VGG19 23.32 ± 0.99 650.73 ± 27.87
ResNet18 22.42 ± 0.91 626.60 ± 25.40
Table 2: Frequency-Domain Norms of Adv. Pert. δ̂ for Nonlinear Models. With similar performance
(Supp. Table 1), Full Width and Bounded Width convolutional models produce adversarial attacks
with smaller ‖δ̂‖1.
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Figure 9: Visualization of the average of the spectra δ̂n over all sampled inputs n for all linear models.
The average spectra are similar to those observed in Figure 8.
Figure 10: Visualization of the average of the spectra δ̂n over all sampled inputs n for all nonlinear
models. The average spectra are similar to the examples observed in Figure 4
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(a) (b)
Figure 11: (a) The impact of initial weight scale α on the adversarial spectrum of linear models.
Higher α induces higher frequency spectra for both locally connected and convolutional models.
(b) The impact of initial weight scale α on the adversarial spectrum of nonlinear models. Higher α
induces higher frequency spectra for both locally connected and convolutional models.
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B Experimental Details
B.1 Model Architectures
Model Architecture # Hidden Layers Nonlinearity Channels
Fully Connected 1,3 None, ReLU 2700
Bounded Width Convolution 1,3 None, ReLU (3,32)
Full Width Convolution 1,3 None, ReLU 3
Locally Connected 1 None, ReLU 32
Table 3: Model Architectures
B.2 Model Performance
Model Architecture Test Accuracy
Fully Connected (Linear) 41%
Locally Connected (Linear) 35%
Full Width Convolution (Linear) 41%
Bounded Width Convolution (Linear) 41%
Deep Fully Connected (Linear) 41%
Deep Full Width Convolution (Linear) 36%
Deep Bounded Width Convolution (Linear) 41%
Fully Connected (NonLinear) 52%
Locally Connected (NonLinear) 54%
Bounded Width Convolution (NonLinear) 63%
Shallow ResNet (NonLinear) 64%
VGG19 91%
ResNet18 92%
Table 4: Test Accuracy for all models trained. All linear models have similar performance. Nonlinear
models exhibit more variability.
B.3 Training Hyperparameters
Model Architecture Learning Rate Batch Size Learning Rate Drop
Bounded Width Convolution .01 128 Yes
Fully Connected .01 128 Yes
Locally Connected .01 128 Yes
Full Width Convolution .002 128 Yes
Bounded Width Convolution .002 128 Yes
Table 5: Learning rates for the various models considered. All other hyper-parameters were fixed.
Learning Rates. We tuned the max learning rates for each model by starting from a base learning
rate of of 0.1, and then, if there were visible failures during training (most commonly, the model
converging to chance performance), we adjusted the learning rate up/down by a factor of 10 or 50.
Amongst the model architectures we explored, the only hyper-parameter that was tuned was the
learning rate. The final values of the learning rates after search are detailed in Table 5.
In addition, all the models were trained with linearly decaying learning rate follow 0.3 factor for each
epoch and resetting the learning rate back to max when you trained the model at least 20 epochs. All
models were trained for at least 40 epochs and we choose the epoch with the highest accuracy for
further experiments.
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Attack Metric Learning Rate Number of Steps Max Norm, 
Projected Gradient Descent L∞ 0.1 1000 8.0/255.0
Table 6: Adversarial Attack hyperparameters
B.4 Adversarial Attack Configurations
Learning Rates. All the models adversarial attacks were generated using the configuration above
with the Foolbox package [17].
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